I came here after reading George Will's op-ed. This is a reasonable idea, but for it to be successful the commission will have to address both revenue and expenditure.
Your point regarding the importance of putting both revenue and spending under consideration is significant, and I wonder if it might be a major barrier to getting Congress to agree to this type of commission for entitlement reform.
Looking at the original BRAC commission example, I would assume that, while there would have been some differences of opinion to work through among experts about the right list of bases, the commission was not negotiating deep ideological conflicts over the basic question of how to identify a redundant or underutilized military base. Similarly, other than avoiding the closure of a base in their own geography (or at least the blame for it), members of Congress were not overly concerned as to how the base list would be arrived at.
The situation looks very different with entitlements. There are large ideological judgments at play when considering how to meet a future debt target for 70% of the federal budget. Solutions could range from heavy reliance on increasing taxes and other revenue streams to implementing almost entirely benefit cuts or eligibility adjustments. And with both tax and benefit changes, there are further questions about whether to apply changes to everyone or only a subset of the population (e.g., wealthy). Deferring to experts doesn’t resolve these value judgements, it just means that the outcome of the process would be influenced heavily by the ideological bent of who was put on the commission. The commission itself may deadlock just like Congress. I believe that is, more or less, what happened with Obama’s Simpson-Bowles commission, which didn’t even get to the part where Congress got to vote on their recommendations. The commission itself couldn’t achieve a consensus!
All of which is to say that I don’t think Congress would be comfortable with giving a commission a simple debt target without more detailed directions or constraints as to how they go about meeting it. Are they supposed to meet the debt target while maximizing long-term GDP growth? While ensuring “pain” is spread equally among everyone? While protecting lower income seniors from any impact? While maximizing average lifespan? “All of the above” is not a clear directive. Or maybe there would be a prescribed revenue increase vs. spending cut mix to which they must adhere. But the latter raises the problem of how Congress would agree to a mix in the first place.
There are also questions as to just how much latitude this commission would have to make policy changes. Could they just decide to levy a new 20% federal VAT? Allow the Trust Funds to make investments in the stock market to juice returns? Cut off Medicare and/or Social Security entitlements from higher income seniors to transform the programs into social assistance? Expand entitlements in some areas that they feel are deserving? All these possibilities would alarm many members of Congress in ways that choosing a military base to close would not.
I do believe that an empowered commission could be a very powerful tool to resolve at least one aspect of reining in the deficit. Legislating changes to Medicare / Medicaid to slow the growth of spending is extremely difficult for Congress to do. And not just because of deadlock. The health system is so complicated that authorizing effective legislation is basically impossible for almost anyone in Congress. The ACA revealed this clearly: thousands of pages, heavy reliance on lobbyists, no one really understanding what they were voting for, and promises of improved spending trajectories that don’t materialize. Giving an expert commission a clear spending growth target for healthcare programs (e.g., holding spending as a percentage of GDP steady in the face of an aging population) with some principle to drive decision-making (e.g., while maximizing QALY of the covered population) and allowing them to make the necessary program changes (and regulatory changes) to achieve this could be desirable. Raising additional revenue is likely necessary for Medicare as well. But, I think that Congress would have to approve that change, perhaps on advice from a commission.
I came here after reading George Will's op-ed. This is a reasonable idea, but for it to be successful the commission will have to address both revenue and expenditure.
Your point regarding the importance of putting both revenue and spending under consideration is significant, and I wonder if it might be a major barrier to getting Congress to agree to this type of commission for entitlement reform.
Looking at the original BRAC commission example, I would assume that, while there would have been some differences of opinion to work through among experts about the right list of bases, the commission was not negotiating deep ideological conflicts over the basic question of how to identify a redundant or underutilized military base. Similarly, other than avoiding the closure of a base in their own geography (or at least the blame for it), members of Congress were not overly concerned as to how the base list would be arrived at.
The situation looks very different with entitlements. There are large ideological judgments at play when considering how to meet a future debt target for 70% of the federal budget. Solutions could range from heavy reliance on increasing taxes and other revenue streams to implementing almost entirely benefit cuts or eligibility adjustments. And with both tax and benefit changes, there are further questions about whether to apply changes to everyone or only a subset of the population (e.g., wealthy). Deferring to experts doesn’t resolve these value judgements, it just means that the outcome of the process would be influenced heavily by the ideological bent of who was put on the commission. The commission itself may deadlock just like Congress. I believe that is, more or less, what happened with Obama’s Simpson-Bowles commission, which didn’t even get to the part where Congress got to vote on their recommendations. The commission itself couldn’t achieve a consensus!
All of which is to say that I don’t think Congress would be comfortable with giving a commission a simple debt target without more detailed directions or constraints as to how they go about meeting it. Are they supposed to meet the debt target while maximizing long-term GDP growth? While ensuring “pain” is spread equally among everyone? While protecting lower income seniors from any impact? While maximizing average lifespan? “All of the above” is not a clear directive. Or maybe there would be a prescribed revenue increase vs. spending cut mix to which they must adhere. But the latter raises the problem of how Congress would agree to a mix in the first place.
There are also questions as to just how much latitude this commission would have to make policy changes. Could they just decide to levy a new 20% federal VAT? Allow the Trust Funds to make investments in the stock market to juice returns? Cut off Medicare and/or Social Security entitlements from higher income seniors to transform the programs into social assistance? Expand entitlements in some areas that they feel are deserving? All these possibilities would alarm many members of Congress in ways that choosing a military base to close would not.
I do believe that an empowered commission could be a very powerful tool to resolve at least one aspect of reining in the deficit. Legislating changes to Medicare / Medicaid to slow the growth of spending is extremely difficult for Congress to do. And not just because of deadlock. The health system is so complicated that authorizing effective legislation is basically impossible for almost anyone in Congress. The ACA revealed this clearly: thousands of pages, heavy reliance on lobbyists, no one really understanding what they were voting for, and promises of improved spending trajectories that don’t materialize. Giving an expert commission a clear spending growth target for healthcare programs (e.g., holding spending as a percentage of GDP steady in the face of an aging population) with some principle to drive decision-making (e.g., while maximizing QALY of the covered population) and allowing them to make the necessary program changes (and regulatory changes) to achieve this could be desirable. Raising additional revenue is likely necessary for Medicare as well. But, I think that Congress would have to approve that change, perhaps on advice from a commission.